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THE BENEFITS OF "JUDICIALLY
UNMANAGEABLE" STANDARDS IN
ELECTION CASES UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
RICHARD L. HASEN"
The conventional story about the Supreme Court's decision in
Baker v. Can to adjudicate disputes over legislative appointment
is that political market failure required judicial intervention. The
market failed in the case of unequally populated districts because
existing legislators could not be expected to vote themselves out of
a job, nor would voters who benefit from the existing
apportionment plan elect legislators inclined to do so. This market
failure makes a strong case for extra-legislative intervention in
apportionment, assuming we-or at least courts-may make the
normative judgment that unequally populated districts are
improper. Thus, a subtext of the conventional story is our trust in
the judiciary. We need faith that judges' impartiality and general
wisdom makes up for a lack of particular competence in dealing
with political matters. Opponents of judicial intervention doubted
judicial competence in this area, calling for nonjusticiability
because "standards... were lacking." This concern over "judicial
manageability" turned out to be seriously exaggerated in the
legislative apportionment and districting cases, where the Court's
adoption in Reynolds v. Sims of a strict standard required little
more than knowledge of "sixth grade arithmetic," but it has
proven more real in other cases, most recently, in Bush v. Gore.
This Article argues that the Baker majority and dissenters failed to
appreciate the benefits of judicial unmanageability for dealing with
election cases under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Precisely because these cases require the Supreme
Court to make (at least implicit) normative judgments about the
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meaning of democracy or the structure of representative
government, the danger of manageable standards is that they
ossify the new rules and enshrine the current Court majority's
political theory. That enshrinement is precisely what happened in
the one-person, one-vote cases.
We cannot be surprised that the Court adopted the manageable
standard of equally apportioned districts in Reynolds; manageable
standards lower administrative costs, decrease the chances of lower
court deviation from Supreme Court preferences, and increase
reliance interests of those involved in the electoral process. But,
we must recognize the cost of manageable standards as well. In
contrast to Reynolds, when the Court does not articulate a
manageable standard, it leaves room for future Court majorities to
deviate from or modify a ruling in light of new thinking about the
meaning of democracy or the structure of representative
government, or based on experience with the existing standard. It
also allows for greater experimentation and variation in the lower
courts using the new standard. Following modification and
experimentation, it then often will be appropriate for the Court to
articulate a more manageable standard.
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INTRODUCTION
The conventional story about the Supreme Court's decision in
Baker v. Carr1 to adjudicate disputes over legislative apportionment is
that political market failure required judicial intervention The
market failed in the case of unequally populated districts because
existing legislators could not be expected to vote themselves out of a
job, nor would voters who benefit from the existing apportionment
plan elect legislators inclined to do so. 3 This market failure makes a
strong case for extra-legislative intervention in apportionment,
assuming we, or at least courts, may make the normative judgment
that unequally populated districts are improper.4
A subtext of this conventional story is trust in the judiciary. We
need faith that judges' impartiality and general wisdom make up for a
lack of particular competence in dealing with political matters.
Opponents of judicial intervention doubted judicial competence in
this area, calling for nonjusticiability because "standards ... for
judicial judgment are lacking."'  This concern over "judicial
manageability" turned out to be seriously exaggerated in the
legislative apportionment and districting cases, where the court's
adoption in Reynolds v. Sims of a strict "one person, one vote"
standard required little more than knowledge of "sixth grade
arithmetic,"6 but it has proven more real in other cases, most recently,
as I will explain, in Bush v. Gore.7
This Article argues that the Baker Court majority and dissenters
apparently failed to appreciate the benefits of judicial
unmanageability or murky standards for dealing with election cases
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980)
("[U]nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought
preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage.").
3. See id. at 121 (noting that elected representatives have an incentive "toward
maintaining whatever apportionment, good or bad, it is that got and keeps them where
they are").
4. For a look at this normative question going back to John Locke and to the framers
of the United States Constitution, see the sources cited in id. at 122 n.55.
5. Baker, 369 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
6. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); see also ELY, supra note 2, at 121 (calling administrability the one-person,
one-vote standard's "long suit").
7. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Precisely because these cases require the Supreme Court to make at
least implicit normative judgments about the meaning of democracy
or the structure of representative government, the danger of
manageable standards is that they ossify the new rules and enshrine
the current Court majority's political theory. That enshrinement is
precisely what happened in the one-person, one-vote cases.
Arguably, we cannot be surprised that the Court adopted the
manageable standard of equally apportioned districts in Reynolds;
arguably manageable standards lower administrative costs, decrease
the chances of lower court deviation from Supreme Court
pronouncements, and increase reliance interests of those involved in
the electoral process. 8 But we must recognize the cost of manageable
standards as well.
In contrast to Reynolds, when the Court does not articulate a
manageable standard, it leaves room for future Court majorities to
deviate from or modify rulings in light of new thinking about the
meaning of democracy or the structure of representative government,
or based on experience with the existing standard. It also allows for
greater experimentation and variation in the lower courts using the
new standard. Following modification and experimentation, the
Court appropriately may articulate a more manageable standard.
The benefits of an initial unmanageable standard no doubt come
with costs as well: greater administrative costs, increased straying by
the lower courts from Supreme Court majority pronouncements, and
a decreased ability of political actors to rely upon Supreme Court
precedent. But lack of Court competence in political matters suggests
that those costs are worth bearing, at least for a time, as the Court
and lower courts explore the contours of new equal protection rights
created in election law cases.
This analysis leads to a two-part prescription for how the
Supreme Court should handle equal protection claims in election
cases. First, the Court should intervene only when the political
process cannot correct itself from apparent political market failure. I
8. In a thoughtful recent paper, Spencer Overton explores this issue in the context of
the debate over "rules" versus "standards." Spencer A. Overton, Rules, Standards, and
Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65 passim
(2002). Overton's primary focus, however, is on the use of rules versus standards as a
"kind of structural determination about who will make decisions." Id, at 66. He sees the
choice about the extent to which the Court should "check the discretion of
decisionmakers." Id. My focus here is on what the Court does to bind its own hand in
future cases, with the understanding that reinterpreting a vague judicial standard is easier
than overruling a non-vague rule.
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suggest this limit because judges are not particularly competent to
decide these questions. Thus, courts should engage in the exercise
only when the legislative self-interest problem leaves the Court as the
only practical alternative to inaction. Second, when the Supreme
Court is convinced that intervention is necessary, it must articulate an
appropriately precise standard for judging equal protection claims:
the more controversial the Court's normative political theory
underlying the claim in a particular case, the more it should strive to
articulate legal standards that leave wiggle room for future Court
majorities to modify.9
I do not claim that the Court has articulated unmanageable
standards in the past for this reason; often such an articulation has
been the product of political compromise, sloppy drafting, or
unforeseen circumstances. My claim is that the Court should, at least
initially, articulate unmanageable standards in certain equal
protection election cases in the future.
Much has been written about the first part of this prescription.
For example, Professor Pamela S. Karlan recently has argued that the
Supreme Court's intervention in the 2000 Florida election
controversy was unwarranted because the political process was still
working; others, most notably Judge Richard A. Posner, disagree with
that assessment of the Florida situation," but presumably not with the
premise that judicial intervention is unwarranted when the political
market is well-functioning.
Accordingly, this Article focuses on the second part of the
prescription: the calibration of the manageability of the judicial
standard to the extent of social consensus on the nature of the
meaning of political equality. This second part is especially important
because there may be significant disagreement on the first part-
whether the political market will correct itself. Most scholars writing
about Baker v. Carr and cases in its wake have extolled the virtues of
9. At first blush, my argument has similarities to Cass Sunstein's calls for "judicial
minimalism," which asserts that the Supreme Court decide as little as possible when it
decides controversial cases. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1999). One critical difference between us is
that Sunstein calls for such minimalism "[t]o... allow democratically accountable bodies
to function .... This is one reason why courts should and do act cautiously when they are
in the midst of a 'political thicket.'" Id. at 26. In contrast, I call for initial
unmanageability to give the Supreme Court greater information to settle upon the
ultimate contours of the particular equal protection rule it will craft. I do not disagree,
however, that courts should sometimes act cautiously for the reason Sunstein gives as well.
10. See the discussion between Karlan and Posner in Forum: The Triumph of
Expedience: How America Lost the Election to theCourts, HARPERS, May 2001, at 31,32.
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manageability;" this Article by contrast is in praise of some
unmanageability, at least in certain cases and for a certain period of
time.
Part I of this Article explores whether the Court adopted an
appropriately precise standard in the one-person, one-vote cases.12 It
argues that the Court adopted the most manageable of standards that
in retrospect has been too restrictive of political realities. It further
considers how politics and jurisprudence might have been different
had the Court adopted Justice Stewart's alternative, unmanageable
standard for judging malapportionment claims. 3 Justice Stewart's
standard would have provided greater flexibility in dealing with
apportionment problems and greater information to the Justices as
they refined the new constitutional standards.
Part II of this Article explores three additional areas in which the
Court has adjudicated election cases under the Equal Protection
Clause: cases involving wealth qualifications, n  suffrage
qualifications,'5 and vote counting.'6 These three cases illustrate how
the Court may increase the unmanageability of the equal protection
standards as it faces a more controversial equal protection claim.1 7
Finally, Part III briefly demonstrates how unmanageable
standards may counteract the possibility of court-imposed
proportional representation, which lurks in the background of a
number of election cases under the Equal Protection Clause.'8
Unmanageable standards sometimes will be a better alternative than
11. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the
Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 683, 688, 690, 694 (contrasting the
manageability of the one-person, one-vote standard with the unmanageability of the
standards for judging partisan and racial gerrymandering set forth in later cases); Jeffrey
G. Hamilton, Comment, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political
Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1571 (1994) ("Judicially
manageable standards are necessary if the Court intends to continue on the course set by
the holdings in Shaw v. Reno and Davis v. Bandemer.") (footnotes omitted); Jeremy M.
Taylor, Comment, The Ghost of Harlan: The Unfulfilled Search for Judicially Manageable
Standards in Voting Rights Litigation, 65 Miss. LJ. 431, 435 (1995) (calling upon the
Supreme Court to "develop and adopt a workable and stable judicial standard" to guide
the lower courts in current voting rights controversies). For a brief article arguing against
judicially manageable standards and in favor of the use of multiple criteria, see Paul S.
Edwards & Nelson W. Polsby, Introduction: The Judicial Regulation of Political
Processes-In Praise of Multiple Criteria, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 190 (1991).
12. See infra pp. 1475-83.
13. See infra pp. 1483-88.
14. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
15. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621 (1969).
16. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
17. See infra pp. 1489-98.
18. See infra pp. 1498-1503.
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denying relief altogether. Part III makes this point by contrasting two
cases. In Mobile v. Bolden,19 the Court rejected a claim that an at-
large districting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. It did so
at least in part because it believed that to hold otherwise would have
imposed a system of proportional representation on the creation of
legislative bodies. In Davis v. Bandemer,0  the partisan
gerrymandering case, the Court recognized a claim of an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander under the Equal Protection
Clause, but did so using an unmanageable standard. Contrary to the
predictions of Court Justices not signing the plurality opinion and of
some commentators, the Court in Bandemer successfully avoided
imposing a proportional representation test on partisan
gerrymandering claims. Thus, the Mobile Court was incorrect that a
decision under the Equal Protection Clause inexorably would have
led to proportional representation.
I. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, ONE MANAGEABLE STANDARD
A. Introduction: From Colegrove to Baker in Search of Judicially
Manageable Standards
The one-person, one-vote standard was hardly inevitable. In
1946, Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in Colegrove v. Green21
announced the Court's refusal to enter the "political thicket."'
Frankfurter explained that the Court would not decide legislative
apportionment issues because their "peculiarly political nature" made
them unsuitable "for judicial determination."13
The Court essentially overruled Colegrove in Baker v. Carr,24
thereby allowing challenges to legislative apportionment to go
forward. Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion in Baker,
described the contours of the "political question" doctrine. He
explained that the doctrine precluded judicial intervention in six
categories of cases, including the category of cases in which "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the
dispute existedV
19. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
20. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
21. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
22. Id. at 556 (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 552 (plurality opinion).
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. Id. at 217. The six categories are:
1475
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The majority and dissent in Baker disagreed about whether
apportionment cases fell into this category. Over Justice
Frankfurter's argument in dissent that "standards ... for judicial
judgment are lacking, ' 6 the majority stated that "[j]udicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar,
and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action."2 7 The Baker majority distinguished Colegrove as a Guaranty
Clause case, and characterized that clause as "not a repository of
judicially manageable standards."'
This move by the Baker majority was nothing short of a judicial
sleight-of-hand. As Michael McConnell explained in a recent article:
As an interpretation of the political question doctrine, this
was nonsense. At the time of Baker, the Equal Protection
Clause had never been applied to the districting question,
and there were any number of possible interpretations, with
no judicially manageable means of choosing among them.
("One person, one vote" is obviously a judicially
manageable standard, but at the time of Baker, the Court
had not embraced it.) Conversely, if the Court were inclined
to develop judicially manageable standards under the Equal
Protection Clause, it could do so equally well under the
[Guaranty] Clause. The existence vel non of "judicially
manageable standards" was inherent in the underlying issue,
not in the constitutional label attached to it. Thus, it is hard
to avoid the conclusion that the fateful decision was made
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 207-
09 (1964) (disputing the link between the political question doctrine and the need for
judicially manageable standards).
26. Baker, 369 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 226.
28. Id. at 223.
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for no reason other than to avoid the appearance of a
departure from the nonjusticiability precedents.29
It may be, as McConnell argues, that the choice to. use the Equal
Protection Clause rather than the Guaranty Clause pushed the Court
to choose particularly manageable standards in Reynolds and later
cases." My concern here, however, is not with the doctrinal question
of where (if anywhere) in the Constitution standards for policing the
apportionment process should come from, but rather with the
ramifications of Baker's holding that courts would find judicially
manageable standards in the Equal Protection Clause to decide
apportionment cases.3 1
Justice Brennan's statement in Baker that standards to apply in
this area were "well developed and familiar" was true only if taken to
an unhelpful level of abstraction. Thus, in Baker, the Court
announced the existence of judicially manageable standards, but left
everyone to guess about what those standards should be. Would the
Court require equipopulousity, apportionment that was rational
rather than "arbitrary and capricious," or compliance with some other
standard? The Equal Protection Clause provided no answers on its
face.
A recently published series of Supreme Court conference notes
from the time reveals that the lack of an articulated standard in Baker
apparently stemmed not from an oversight by the Court but from the
political compromises necessary to get a majority vote in favor of
justiciability. On April 20, 1961, during the conference following the
initial oral argument in Baker, Justice Harlan argued that the case
29. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103,106-07 (2000).
30. See iL at 107-08. McConnell argues that the Equal Protection Clause language
committed the Court to a focus on equal populations while a Guaranty Clause claim could
have allowed the Court to focus on preserving the right of a state not to be trampled by a
permanent political minority. But in other equal protection election cases (including the
cases discussed later in this Article), the Court has not imposed any exacting requirement
of strict equality such as in Reynolds.
31. McConnell's argument raises another issue. Baker speaks of "judicialli
discoverable and manageable standards." 369 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Court apparently imposed two requirements. First, the discoverability question suggests
that the text or history of the constitutional provision in question must provide some
guidance on how to decide these cases. McConnell argues that no such guidance exists
regarding how to apply the Equal Protection Clause to districting questions. See
McConnell, supra note 29, at 110. I ignore this discoverability question here because the
Court has gone down and likely will continue to go down the road of deciding these
election cases whether such guidance is "discoverable" from the text or history of the
Constitution or not. The second requirement is judicial manageability. My concern is
with the ramifications of this second requirement.
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should not be justiciable because "[t]his Court is not competent to
solve this type of problem."'32 Justice Brennan responded, "I do not
believe the remedies are insoluble-I worked it out with a judicial
remedy. 3 3 At that point, Brennan obviously was contemplating some
standard, perhaps the one-person, one-vote standard.
Justice Stewart, the swing vote, could not decide how to vote,
and the case was set for reargument.T M Following reargument the next
October, Justice Stewart expressed the view in conference that the
case was justiciable, but he rejected the argument that "equal
protection requires representation approximately commensurate with
voting strength. States could give towns only one vote, whatever their
size. ' 35 By this point, Justice Brennan had proposed asserting
jurisdiction, but not directing a specific decree.36 He hoped that the
"assertion of power would cause the Tennessee legislature to act. ' 37
Thus, the emergence of one person, one vote awaited future Court
decisions, after some changes in Court personnel.38
B. The Most Judicially Manageable of Standards: One Person, One
Vote
The last section demonstrated that Reynolds v. Sims, 39
establishing the one-person, one-vote standard for judging the
constitutionality of state legislative apportionment, did not follow
automatically from Baker. The Court moved there after Baker, first
in Gray v. Sanders,40 striking down unequal weighting of votes within
a single constituency, and then in Wesberry v. Sanders,41 requiring that
congressional districts be drawn on an equal population basis. Gray
prevented states from using a system analogous to the electoral
32. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 846 (Del Dickson ed.,
2001) [hereinafter CONFERENCE] (quoting Justice Harlan). For additional historical
accounts, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME
COURT: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 411-28 (1983); Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William
. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, passim (1997).
33. CONFERENCE, supra note 32, at 846 (quoting Justice Brennan).
34. Id. at 847.
35. Id. at 850 (quoting Justice Stewart).
36. Id. at 849.
37. Id. (quoting Justice Brennan).
38. The case apparently divided the Justices bitterly, as illustrated by a note that
Frankfurter sent to Harlan just before Justice Frankfurter collapsed in his chambers. Id. at
851 n.71. In the note, Frankfurter stated that the Baker majority failed "to appreciate the
intrinsic and acquired majesty of the Court's significance in the affairs of the country." Id.
39. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
40. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
41. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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college in electing statewide officials, but it did not involve the more
common question of a multi-member governmental body. Wesberry
was not decided under the Equal Protection Clause but under Article
I, Sections 2 and 4 of the Constitution, and was thus applicable only
to the United States House of Representatives.4 z As late as the
conference in Wesberry, Justice Brennan hesitated in imposing the
one-person, one-vote standard. He stated, "On the remedy, I think
that we would be wise only to reverse and let the district court fashion
a remedy without giving any hints as to what it should do. There
must be substantial equality. This one is way out of line."43
Nonetheless, first in Wesberry, then in Reynolds, the Court
majority adopted the one-person, one-vote standard. In Wesberry,
the Court held that "as nearly as is practicable[,] one man's vote in a
congressional election [must] be worth as much as another's." In
Reynolds, the Court held that "as a basic constitutional standard, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis. 4
Justice Warren, writing for the Reynolds majority, declared the
principle as the "clear and strong command of"46 the Equal
Protection Clause: "This is at the heart of Lincoln's vision of
'government of the people, by the people, (and) for the people.' The
Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as
of all races."'47 The Court left the states with just a bit of wiggle room:
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard
are based on legitimate considerations incident to the
effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from
the equal-protection principle are constitutionally
permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in
either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state
legislature. But neither history alone, nor economic or other
sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting
to justify disparities from population-based representation.48
42. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW-CASES
AND MATERIALS 113 (2d ed. 2001).
43. CONFERENCE, supra note 32, at 852 (quoting Justice Brennan).
44. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8.
45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 579-80 (footnote omitted).
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The Court held that a state might justify minor deviations for the
sake of keeping political subdivisions together in the state body.49
But a state could not promote that interest if "population is
submerged as the controlling consideration in the apportionment of
seats in the particular legislative body .... ,"5 0
C. The Aftermath of the One-Person, One-Vote Cases and the
Problems of Judicially Manageable Standards
1. One Person, One Vote after Wesberry and Reynolds
The Supreme Court's first foray into the political thicket
required most states to reapportion both congressional and state
legislative districts.5 1 The one-person, one-vote standard announced
by the Court was easy to understand and was popular among the
public.5 2 As Professor Ely points out, once the reapportionment took
place on an equal population basis, controversy over the cases died
down: legislators elected from the newly apportioned districts had
every incentive to preserve the new status quo.53
The only significant litigation regarding state or congressional
apportionment to follow from these cases was the question of how
much a state could deviate from exact mathematical equality for
subordinate reasons, such as the desire to keep a political subdivision
together in one district. The Court has allowed virtually no deviation
in the case of congressional districting, 4 and allowed some, but not
much, deviation in the case of state legislative districts.55
Commentators have criticized the emergence of two standards
for judging deviation depending upon whether congressional or state
legislative districting is involved, pointing out that the text of the
Constitution does not give any reason to treat one more leniently
49. Id.
50. Id. at 581.
51. See ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 4 (1968); see also HAROLD M. STANLEY &
RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 1999-2000, at 74-75
tbl.1-30 (2000) (showing deviations from equality in congressional and state legislative
districts in the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s).
52. See Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67
MICH. L. REv. 223,228-29 (1968).
53. ELY, supra note 2, at 121.
54. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
530-31 (1969).
55. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161 (1993); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735,751 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,329 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,
185 (1971).
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than the other.56 Despite these differences, one person, one vote
remains the overriding component in districting decisions.
More significant litigation arose out of attempts to apply the one-
person, one-vote standard to local elections. Beginning in Avery v.
Midland County, 7 the Court required local government entities to
apply the standard, despite protests that an equally districted state
legislature could use state law if desired to equalize any unequally
districted local or regional entities 8
The Avery Court left open the possibility that the one-person,
one-vote standard would not apply to special purpose districts whose
burdens fell disproportionately on one group.59 In two cases, the
Court applied this exception to exempt elections for special purpose
water districts.' But these exceptions have not been applied widely.
In practice, the lion's share of elections even on the local level are
conducted using the one-person, one-vote standard.
2. Problems with the Judicially Manageable One-Person, One-Vote
Standard
Despite the popularity of the one-person, one-vote standard,
some scholars recently have attacked it. Not all the attacks are
strong; one weak argument claims that the standard has opened up
the political system to all kinds of partisan and racial gerrymandering
and incumbency protection.61  According to this argument, once
legislators became free to violate traditional "constraints" on
redistricting like adherence to the boundaries of political subdivisions
in the name of one person, one vote, they were "liberated to snake
lines all over the map to achieve their own purposes."'6
56. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 42, at 121-22; Jerry R. Parkinson, Note,
Reapportionment: A Call for a Consistent Quantitative Standard, 70 IoWA L. REV. 663,
680-81 (1985).
57. 390 U.S. 474 (1968); see also Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970)
(applying the one-person, one-vote rule to an election for a junior college district).
58. Justice Fortas made this point in his Avery dissent. 390 U.S. at 509 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
59. 390 U.S. at 476.
60. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973). On these exceptions, see LOWENSTEIN &
HASEN, supra note 42, at 132-47; Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home? One Person/One
Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339,360-70 (1993). Briffault argues that
these cases do not state clearly when the exception applies. Briffault, supra, at 366. As I
argue later in the text, however, some uncertainty in this area, at least initially, is desirable.
61. Justice Harlan suggested the possibility of partisan gerrymandering in his
Reynolds dissent. 377 U.S. 533,622 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
62. McConnell, supra note 29, at 112.
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This claim is weak because no such "constraint" ever existed in
the sense of a pre-Reynolds legal obligation on legislators to draw
district lines conforming to the boundaries of political subdivisions.
Although many pre-Reynolds districts conformed to such
subdivisions, conformity resulted from neither legal constraint nor
civic motivation. Self-interested legislators looking to protect their
interests did not need to violate political boundaries because they had
a much more potent weapon to protect themselves: the drawing of
vastly unequal districts or simply preserving districts that had become
increasingly malapportioned over time.63 Indeed, adherence to the
boundaries provided some political cover for legislators to draw or
retain grossly malapportioned districts.
Another, more convincing line of attack has focused on the
Avery branch of these cases. Critics have argued that the one-person,
one-vote standard sometimes works to prevent the formation of
regional governments to deal with problems that appropriately are
handled on a regional, rather than local, basis. As Bruce Cain
recently explained, the Court's decision to apply the standard:
deprived the American people of an entire class of
institutional mechanisms for compromise which could be
used to solve collective action problems. For example, when
the San Francisco Bay area considered establishing a
regional government to cope with problems of growth and
traffic management, its lawyers informed the planners that
they could not design a confederation which did not
conform to the principle of one person, one vote. Since the
smaller cities were unwilling to join into any arrangement
that would allow their suburban votes to be swamped by the
more numerous votes of the larger, urban cities, the
governance problem proved to be insurmountable. What
the Bay Area cities wanted was to replicate the logic of the
original compromise that induced smaller states to join the
large states in the union at the founding of the country. In
effect, the courts made it impossible for modern legislators
to do what the Founding Fathers had been able to do.64
The Bay Area cities were correct in believing the courts would
not uphold a regional compromise that violated the one-person, one-
63. See DIXON, supra note 51, app. A (contrasting state by state the
malapportionment of state legislative districts before and after Reynolds). California, for
example, had a 1,432% deviation in districts before 1966. Id. at 592.
64. Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist's Perspective, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1105, 1110 (1999); see also Edwards & Polsby, supra note 11, at 201
(discussing the problem of the Bay Area regional government).
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vote principle. The Supreme Court rejected a one-borough, one-vote
rule for a regional government body in New York City in Board of
Estimate v. Morris,65 and a federal district court rejected a regional
plan for the Seattle area that violated the principle.66 As Richard
Briffault explained in his careful examination of this problem, "[t]he
inability to create a federal structure in which the principle of
population equality is tempered by a concern for some parity among
the pre-existing units [of local government] may render the regional
unit politically impossible." 67
D. The Road Not Taken: Justice Stewart's Judicially Unmanageable
Alternative
The regional government argument advanced by Professors Cain
and Briffault suggests a number of responses. First, one could argue
that the one-person, one-vote standard's effect of hampering regional
government is unfortunate, but it is a small price to pay for the
fundamental gains in equality that the Court worked in Wesberry and
Reynolds. Second, one could echo Justice Fortas' dissent in Avery,
agreeing that the one-person, one-vote standard was necessary on the
state level but disagreeing with its application on the local level.
Reversal of Avery but not Reynolds would eliminate the de facto
Court prohibition on regional governments, and an equally districted
state legislature could block unequal and unfair regional government
plans.
Both of these responses to the regional government problem are
reasonable ones, and choosing between the two today is difficult. But
perhaps the problem could have been avoided from the beginning.
Despite Justice Brennan's reassuring rhetoric in Baker that equal
protection standards were "well developed and familiar,"' when the
Court decided Baker, Wesberry, Reynolds, and then Avery, it was in
uncharted territory.
At first the Court proceeded cautiously, refusing in Baker to
articulate particular standards to judge the equal protection claim,
with at least Justice Brennan hoping that the threat of Court action
65. 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989).
66. Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885, 895 (W.D. Wash.
1990).
67. Briffault, supra note 60, at 404; see also id. at 344 (stating that "citizen
understanding of and participation in government decisionmaking may be enhanced
where regional government districts are coterminous with community or neighborhood
lines, even where neighborhoods differ in population").
68. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,226 (1962).
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would lead to a political solution. But then the Court in Wesberry
and Reynolds committed itself to the one-person, one-vote principle,
and, with the exception of an allowance for minor deviations in state
legislative districting,69 it has remained behind this principle for nearly
forty years. In Avery, despite protests of Justice Fortas and others,
the Court extended the one-person, one-vote rule to local
government bodies.
In hindsight, the Court may have been wiser to have adopted
initially Justice Stewart's alternative test, which he articulated in one
of the companion cases to Reynolds, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Assembly
District." Stewart agreed the cases were justiciable,71 but he
disagreed with the one-person, one-vote standard. He stated that the
Reynolds majority was wrong in seeing the principle as rooted in a
universally accepted representational theory or historical practice in
the United States.72 He disagreed that unequal districting "debased"
a citizen's votes: "I find it impossible to understand how or why a
voter in California, for instance, either feels or is less a citizen than a
voter in Nevada, simply because, despite their population disparities,
each of these states is represented by two United States Senators." 73
Stewart rejected reliance on population equality alone in view of
what he saw as the legitimate differing needs of different states. He
then put forward his alternative:
The fact is, of course, that population factors must often to
some degree be subordinated in devising a legislative
apportionment plan which is to achieve the important goal
of ensuring a fair, effective, and balanced representation of
the regional, social, and economic interests within a
State.... What constitutes a rational plan reasonably
designed to achieve this objective will vary from State to
State, since each State is unique, in terms of topography,
geography, demography, history, heterogeneity and
concentration of population, variety of social and economic
interests, and in the operation and interrelation of its
political institutions. But so long as a State's apportionment
plan reasonably achieves, in the light of the State's own
characteristics, effective and balanced representation of all
substantial interests, without sacrificing the principle of
69. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
70. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
71. See id. at 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 745 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 227-32
(discussing alternative representational theories to one person, one vote).
73. Lucas, 377 U.S. at 746 (Steward, J., dissenting).
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effective majority rule, that plan cannot be considered
irrational.74
Justice Stewart further explained that his proposed alternative
test for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause had two
attributes: the plan must be rational in light of the state's own
characteristics and needs, and it must not "permit the systematic
frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State."'75
Using this standard, Justice Stewart would have upheld the unequal
districting plans in Colorado and New York,76 but he agreed with the
majority's result in Reynolds to strike down Alabama's scheme, which
he deemed "irrational."77
Justice Stewart's proposed alternative is an homage to judicial
unmanageability 8 Among the terms he did not define carefully in
his alternative are: "subordination," "fair, effective and balanced
representation," "rational," "reasonably designed," "reasonable
achieve[ment]," "effective and balanced representation," "substantial
interests," "effective majority rule," and "systemic frustration of the
will of the majority."
Long and protracted litigation over virtually every state's
apportionment likely would have followed from the adoption of
Justice Stewart's alternative standard. Perhaps the litigation would
have boiled down to a question of whether the challenged scheme
looked more like Alabama's scheme, which fails Justice Stewart's
test, than New York's scheme, which passes Justice Stewart's test.
More likely, lower courts would have developed more specific tests
74. Id. at 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 753-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 765 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He took various positions in the other cases
decided concurrently. See Carl Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One
Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 58.
77. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 588 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). McConnell
recently endorsed Justice Stewart's standard, but said it is more properly grounded in the
Guaranty Clause than the Equal Protection Clause. McConnell, supra note 29, at 114
n.47. For a defense of grounding these cases in equal protection, see ELY, supra note 2, at
118-19 (discussing this issue); Auerbach, supra note 76, at 74-79.
78. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 76, at 58-59 ("Mr. Justice Stewart justifies
disproportionate representation as necessary to check the concentrated power of the most
populous areas, but he does not indicate, satisfactorily, how much disproportionateness he
would tolerate."); see also id. at 61 ("The difficulty with Mr. Justice Stewart's test of
effective majority rule (and any other such test designed to sanction minority veto power)
is that it is unable, logically, to specify any percentage short of 100 (or unanimity) which
should empower the taking of affirmative action."); Note, The Theory of the
Reapportionment Cases, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1228, 1246 (1966) ("The difficulty confronting
all proposals [like Justice Stewart's] to overrepresent certain interests is that there are no
standards for deciding which interests should be favored.").
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for judging the constitutionality of state plans, and likely those courts'
tests would conflict. The Court then would have been asked to bring
some order to this chaos.
This description may appear to have little to commend it; we are
all to a greater or lesser extent drawn to political order over chaos.79
But a period of uncertainty and experimentation in this area would
have been a positive, rather than a negative. Prior to Reynolds,
judges had no experience engaging in this massive redistricting
enterprise. Perhaps judicial intervention would be for the good;
perhaps it would not. But the one-person, one-vote rule was a single,
decisive step in one direction; Justice Stewart's alternative test would
have allowed for initial baby steps in different directions by lower-
level decisionmakers who did not have to speak definitively for the
nation.0
Critics feared that Justice Stewart's test, which would have
required the courts to delve into the details of political power in each
state, would have unduly burdened the courts and undermined their
legitimacy. For example, Professor Deutsch argued that the test
would indeed require the Court to canvass the actual
workings of the floor leadership in the legislative branches,
the mechanisms of party control not only over voters and
the city government but also over elected representatives-
in short, the details of the petty corruption and networks of
personal influence that all too often constitute crucial
sources of power in municipal politics .... Even assuming
that the evidence was available and would be forthcoming, is
it likely that our society could accept, as a steady diet, the
spectacle of the judiciary solemnly ruling on the accuracy of
a political boss's testimony concerning the sources of his
power over voters and the degree of control that he
exercised over elected officials?"1
79. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. C~i. L. REv. 695, 714
(2001).
80. Perhaps, a manageable standard was necessary in Reynolds because it was the
Court's first real entry into a state's political processes. Briffault argues that Stewart's
position "could have been seen as an apologia for the perpetuation of malapportionment,"
Briffault, supra note 60, at 415, and that the Court's decisive one-person, one-vote
standard may have "enhanced the legitimacy of judicial intervention ... by indicating that
questions of representation could be resolved by a relatively simple formal rule, rather
than a complex analysis." Id. But my main point is a more general one about how the
Court should handle equal protection claims in the election area in the future.
81. Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN L. REV. 169, 247 (1968); see also
ELY, supra note 2, at 124 (endorsing Deutsch's view and explaining that the Court
adopted the one-person, one-vote standard rather than Stewart's "in-between" standard
[Vol. 801486
2002] JUDICIALLY UNMANAGEABLE STANDARDS 1487
Deutsch's argument raised a genuine concern, though one that
appears in hindsight to be unwarranted in light of current litigation
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires the courts to
engage in exactly this kind of analysis.82 The concern could have been
tested in the lower courts as they struggled with the new
unmanageable standard. This period of experimentation would have
benefited not only the development of standards for Supreme Court
policing of the districting process, but aided the Supreme Court's
thinking about further entries into the political thicket, such as its
later forays into policing of racial or partisan gerrymandering. 3
Nor would characterizing Justice Stewart's standard as one that
would have promoted more result-oriented judging be fair."4 Once
the Court entered into this thicket, the choice was not one between
judging based upon objective standards and result-oriented judging.
"precisely because of considerations of administrability"); Auerbach, supra note 76, at 61
("Any effort to apply [Justice Stewart's] test practically calls for such a detailed evaluation
of the politics of a state-which are always subject to change-that its application would
hurl the Court back into the thicket of non-justiciable issues.").
82. Section 2 proscribes state imposition of any voting rule "which results in denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of" race,
color, or membership in a protected language group. Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(a). It defines such abridgement as established
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election ... are not equally open to participation by
members of a [protected] class. . . in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
Voting Rights Act § 2,42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b).
The statute further explains that section 2 does not establish a right to
proportional representation. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,
96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)). The Supreme Court
imposed some manageability in this area in articulating a three-prong threshold test in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). See generally LOWENSTEIN & HASEN,
supra note 42, at 230-81 (providing a general discussion of Thornburg v. Gingles).
83. In contrast to this position, Peter Schuck argues against a separation of rights and
remedies, claiming in particular that judges should consider the scope of the remedy
before finding the violation of any particular right. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT 186-89 (1983).
84. Cf Overton, supra note 8, at 95 ("Standards allow judges to introduce arbitrary
and subjective political biases into their deliberations and thus do not clearly confine the
decisionmaking power of judges."). My point is simply that a bright-line rule like the one-
person, one-vote standard similarly allows judges to introduce subjective political biases
into the rule, though it is done in one fell swoop.
A separate criticism of Stewart's rule, raised by Lowenstein, is that the standard
would have threatened the pluralist system of districting by requiring that the content (that
is, outcome) of a districting process be rational. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme
Court Has No Theory of Politics-And Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCEss 245,251 (David K. Ryden ed., 2000). I
do not deal with this criticism in this Article.
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Rather the choice was whether to have all the results dictated at the
front end through the one-person, one-vote rule, or to allow for
variation on the back-end through Justice Stewart's flexible standard.
Arguably the latter is a more satisfactory solution, at least initially,
and at least in situations like the apportionment cases where highly
disputed normative principles are involved.
That is not to say that the Court should never have refined
Justice Stewart's test into a more manageable standard, perhaps even
eventual use of the one-person, one-vote standard. But the Court lost
valuable information by moving decisively, rather than incrementally.
Of course, nothing now formally prevents the Court from
backpedaling from a decisive standard like the one-person, one-vote
standard. But my sense is that a move from a mushy unmanageable
standard to a more manageable standard is easier for the Court than
to overrule existing precedent or even to make a sub silentio switch
from a firm manageable standard to mushiness. The point is
illustrated by the criticism that the Court has faced in for its
inconsistent willingness to allow slight deviations in district
populations depending upon whether the districting is congressional
or state/local.' Had this distinction developed incrementally out of
an unmanageable standard, it would have likely faced greater
acceptance.
In addition, the Court sometimes will not get valuable
information about the effects of its decision when it adopts a
manageable standard in the first instance, and therefore will not know
about the need to backpedal. For example, the problems with
regional government formation perhaps were not appreciated
adequately at the time the Court decided Avery. With a Stewart-like
standard applied on the local level, the Court could have observed
whether state legislatures responded to regional government plans
that failed to comply with one person, one vote. Perhaps the
legislatures would have blocked such plans with great population
disparities; or perhaps the legislatures would have approved of such
plans, finding that the "federal" model was politically desirable on the
regional level. Perhaps also the Court could have observed the
success or failure of political pressure on the state government from
those people in malapportioned regional government districts. This
information would have proved valuable to the Court in considering
the ultimate constitutionality of unequally apportioned regional
government schemes.
85. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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II. CALIBRATING CONTROVERSY TO UNMANAGEABILITY:
WEALTH QUALIFICATIONS, VOTER QUALIFICATIONS, AND VOTE-
COUNTING STANDARDS
Unmanageability is not an unmitigated good in election law
cases. As noted in the introduction, unmanageability imposes greater
administrative costs, increased straying by the lower courts from
Supreme Court majority preference, and a decreased ability of
political actors to rely upon Supreme Court precedent.
These concerns are mitigated, however, when the Court
calibrates the unmanageability of its standard to the novelty or
controversy of its equal protection holding: the greater the novelty or
controversy surrounding the holding, the more unmanageable the
standard that the Court should articulate. To illustrate this approach
using three cases of increasing novelty or controversy, consider
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Electionss6 Kramer v. Union Free
School District No. 15,1 and Bush v. Gore.8 Harper involved a poll
tax for voting in state elections, Kramer involved a law limiting the
franchise in a school district election to owners and renters of taxable
realty in the district, along with their spouses, and parents or
guardians of children in public schools, and Bush v. Gore concerned
the standards over a recount of votes for Florida's electors in the 2000
presidential election.
Before proceeding with this analysis, I must detour with a
significant caveat. In the introduction, I explained that when the
Supreme Court considers intervening in an election law dispute under
the Equal Protection Clause, it should undertake a two-part analysis.
First, the Court should intervene only when the political process
cannot correct itself from apparent political market failure. Second, if
the Court intervenes, it should engage in the calibration that I am
now describing. My detour looks at the first part of this test-
political market failure-for the three cases at issue.
Harper looks like a case that passes the first test because voters
frozen out of the political process cannot use the political process to
get in.89 Kramer is a more questionable case on this basis. Although
voters excluded from the school district election could not effectively
use the local political process to get relief, arguably the voters-who
were fully enfranchised in state elections---could have used the state
86. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
87. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
88. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
89. See ELY, supra note 2, at 120.
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political process to change the rules for school district electionsf0
Bush v. Gore is a case that convincingly fails the first test. The
political process was working, not failing, with the Florida legislature
and United States Congress poised to step in if necessary.9
Despite the fact that one and perhaps two of the three cases I
choose in this part are cases in which the Court should not have
intervened, I focus here on only the second part of the test. That is,
assuming the Court was correct in intervening in these cases, was the
level of manageability of the rule enunciated by the Court properly
calibrated to the novelty of the equal protection holding? This second
part of the test is especially important if, as in the case of Bush v.
Gore, the Court will sometimes err in the first part of the analysis.
A. Little Novelty/Highly Manageable Standard
Harper fits into the category of cases in which the Court's equal
protection holding had little novelty and therefore it was appropriate
for the Court to articulate a highly manageable standard. In Harper,
Virginia residents sought to have Virginia's poll tax, which required
an annual payment of one dollar and fifty cents as a precondition to
voting, declared unconstitutional.92 The Court chose not to rely upon
history indicating that the tax originally was devised to disenfranchise
African Americans,9' instead asking whether a fairly applied poll tax
could violate the Equal Protection Clause.94
The Court, in holding that a fairly applied poll tax violated equal
protection, announced a bright-line manageable rule: "We conclude
that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment
of any fee an electoral standard."95 The Court's rationale was
90. But cf Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE LJ. 1037, 1048-51 (1980) (disputing the ability
of the plaintiff in Kramer to get assistance on the state level).
91. See Richard L. Hasen, A "Tincture of Justice": Judge Posner's Failed
Rehabilitation of Bush v. Gore, 80 TEX. L. REV. 137,148-49 (2001) (book review).
92. The tax was collected along with personal property taxes. Those who did not pay
a personal property tax were not assessed for the poll tax, "it being their responsibility to
take the initiative and request to be assessed." Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 664 n.1 (1966).
93. See id. at 666 n.3. The dissenting Justices agreed that a poll tax intended as a
device to discriminate on the basis of race would be unconstitutional. See id. at 672
(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 683 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 666.
95. Id.
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similarly simple: "Voter qualifications have no relationship to wealth
nor to paying or not paying this or any tax. 9 6
The Court did not need to announce such a bright-line rule in
striking down Virginia's poll tax. For example, the Court could have
said something more opaque like: "Because the right to vote is so
fundamental and because a poll tax will make it more likely that the
poor people will fail to vote in Virginia elections, the state has the
burden of proving convincingly that a substantial relationship exists
between the poll tax and voter qualifications. The state has made no
such showing here."
The Court was correct in articulating a highly manageable
standard. The reason is not that the doctrinal case under the Equal
Protection Clause for the rule was stronger than the doctrinal case for
the one-person, one-vote rule in Reynolds. As Ely explained, despite
the Harper Court calling the poll tax "irrational," "[i]t may also be
true, or at least it is not irrational to think so, that persons of some
wealth tend to be more 'responsible' citizens or, more plausibly still,
that willingness to pay a fee for voting is some reflection of serious
interest in the election." 97 Instead, the Court was correct in using the
manageable standard because a near social consensus existed in the
United States against the poll tax by the time the Court decided
Harper.
The case for this social consensus was made, somewhat
ironically,98 by Justice Harlan in his Harper dissent. Justice Harlan
explained that poll taxes in federal elections had already been banned
by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which had passed very quickly 9
Most states had abolished poll taxes for state and local elections,
leaving only four states (including Virginia) still using them.1° After
setting forth the old argument that the poll tax encourages the "right"
kind of voters to vote, Justice Harlan explained that such "viewpoints,
to be sure, ring hollow on most contemporary ears. Property and
96. Id.
97. ELY, supra note 2, at 120; see also Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the
Legislature Thereof May Direct". The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE:
BUSH, GORE, & THE SUPREME COURT 13, 15 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein
eds., 2001) (characterizing Harper as a "free-form decision" that was "something of a
stretch under classical equal protection law given that a poll tax is facially neutral and,
unlike literacy tests, can be applied in a mechanical way that eliminates the dangers of
political discretion").
98. Harlan raised the point to show that Congress or the constitutional amendment
process could take care of the problem, and that it was not the Court's place to hold the
poll tax unconstitutional.
99. Harper, 383 U.S. at 680,685 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current
egalitarian norms of how a modern democracy should be
organized." 101
The Court's position was thus neither novel nor particularly
controversial. Indeed, it was in line with an emerging view of political
equality that excluded wealth considerations."a2  In such
circumstances, the Court properly articulated a manageable standard
eliminating all wealth qualifications for voting.
B. Intermediate Novelty/Less Manageable Standard
Kramer fits into the category of cases in which the Court's equal
protection holding had somewhat greater novelty than Harper and
therefore it was appropriate for the Court to articulate a somewhat
less manageable standard. In Kramer, the plaintiff, an unmarried
district resident who lived with his parents, brought a class action suit
challenging a New York law limiting the franchise in his school
district's election to owners and renters of taxable realty in the
district, along with their spouses, and parents or guardians of children
in public schools. The plaintiff did not challenge the age, citizenship,
or residency requirements imposed by the district.10 3
By the time the Court decided Kramer in 1969, it had
understood its earlier cases such as Reynolds and Harper to require
application of strict scrutiny to voting classifications because voting
constituted a "fundamental right."'' "° Strict scrutiny requires that the
state provide a compelling state interest to justify its discrimination
and that the means be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. The
Court held that the state failed to meet its burden under strict
scrutiny and that the New York law therefore was unconstitutional.
Of particular interest here is that the Court articulated a fairly
unmanageable standard to apply in future cases.
The state argued that it had a legitimate interest in limiting the
franchise in school district elections to those "primarily interested in
such elections" and that the category of those persons allowed to vote
101. Id. at 685-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 93-
101 (1993). Contemporary criticism of Harper is rare. For some examples, see William J.
Michael, The Original Understanding of Original Intent: A Textual Analysis, 26 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 201, 214 (2000); Stephen J. Safranek, Can Science Guide Legal
Argumentation? The Role of Metaphor in Constitutional Cases, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 357,
364 (1994).
103. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621,622 (1969).
104. See id. at 628. See generally LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 42, at 41-42
(providing a general discussion of the Supreme Court's equal protection doctrines).
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were those primarily interested in school affairs. 10 5 The Court
understood the argument as one limiting the franchise to those
"directly affected" by school affairs, rather than those "subjectively
concerned" about school matters." 6 As the Court wrote:
The State apparently reasons that since the schools are
financed in part by local property taxes, persons whose out-
of-pocket expenses are 'directly' affected by property tax
changes should be allowed to vote. Similarly, parents of
children in school are thought to have a 'direct' stake in
school affairs and are given a vote.0 7
The Court declined to reach the question of whether the state's
interest was compelling. 08  Instead, the Court held that the
classification was not narrowly tailored to meet the interest. "The
classifications [of the state law] permit inclusion of many persons who
have, at best, a remote and indirect interest, in school affairs and, on
the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest
in the school meeting decisions."'19 The Court elaborated in a
footnote:
For example, appellant resides with his parents in the
school district, pays state and federal taxes and is interested
in and affected by school board decisions; however, he has
no vote. On the other hand, an uninterested unemployed
young man who pays no state or federal taxes, but who rents
an apartment in the district, can participate in the election."0
As Briffault has noted, the Court in Kramer, as it had in Baker,
engaged in a judicial sleight-of-hand."' It wrote that it understood
the state's argument as one about an objective interest in elections,
but its analysis switched to the plaintiff's subjective state of mind and
the subjective state of mind the fictional unemployed counterpart in
holding the provision was not narrowly tailored."2
105. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 630-31.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 631.
108. Id. at 632 n.14.
109. Id. at 632.
110. Id. at 632 n.15 (emphases added).
111. Briffault, supra note 60, at 354-56.
112. Briffault writes:
[T]he Court's use of the term "interest," and its contrast between [plaintiff]
and his fictional unemployed counterpart, suggests that the relevant interests
were subjective states of mind, rather than objective ties to school board
operations. Kramer was attentive to and concerned about local school affairs.
He was, therefore, "interested." His fictional unemployed counterpart was
indifferent when the subject of education came up and therefore, not
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Thus, the Court enunciated a fuzzy rule when it could have
enunciated a manageable standard. The Court failed to define what
"constitutes an 'interest' sufficient to justify a claim to the
franchise ' 113 in the school district election. The Court could have
simply and clearly held that the franchise may not be limited except
on the basis of age, citizenship, and residency. That would be an
exceedingly manageable rule to apply in future cases.
Perhaps the Court did not so hold because to do so would have
contradicted directly the Court's earlier decision in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections."' In Lassiter, the Court
upheld a fairly applied literacy test on grounds that the "ability to
read and write.., has some relation to standards designed to
promote intelligent use of the ballot."'15 A rule that limits voter
qualifications to age, citizenship, and residency has no room for
literacy tests. Despite the fact that Justice Black focused his Kramer
dissent on his inability to distinguish the case from Lassiter,"6 the
Kramer majority did not even cite Lassiter.
In retrospect, the Court's articulation of a less manageable
standard may have been wise. As Briffault argues, the
disenfranchisement in Kramer was not especially troubling-it did not
disenfranchise traditionally victimized groups, no entrenchment of a
territorial minority existed, and no class discrimination existed.11 7
Thus, the extension of equal protection law in this direction was
somewhat novel. Moreover, unlike the situation in Harper, there was
no evidence of a societal consensus that voting qualifications like the
ones in Kramer or Lassiter were improper. The Court faced a
situation where the equal protection issue was more novel, and thus
the Court was correct to be less than crystal clear on the rule to apply
in future cases.
The fuzziness of the Kramer standard gave room for the Court to
further refine franchise standards. It carved out an exception for
I
"interested." Thus, the state statute had failed to discriminate with sufficient
precision when it sought to vest the school board's franchise only in those
"interested."
Id. at 355-56.
113. Id. at 355.
114. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
115. Id. at 51. Congress subsequently banned literacy tests in the Voting Rights Act.
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (1994)).
116. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 634 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
117. Briffault, supra notes 60, at 356.
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special purpose districts in which the franchise could indeed be
limited to classes of persons disproportionately impacted by the
district's decisions. Indeed, in such elections, votes could be allocated
other than on a one-person, one-vote basis.18
What emerged from Kramer and the cases involving special
election districts is a more nuanced set of rules that prohibits
additional voter qualifications in most elections but allows such
qualifications in a special class of elections. That regime would have
been much harder to create if the Kramer Court had simply said "no
additional voter qualifications in any elections." Still, the difficulty of
satisfying the exception for special purpose district elections suggests
that the Court should have created an even murkier standard in
Kramer.
C. High Novelty/Unmanageable Standard
Bush v. Gore fits into the category of cases in which the Court's
equal protection holding had great novelty and therefore the Court
properly articulated an unmanageable standard. 1 9 Much ink has
been spilled and continues to be spilled on this case, 20 and I do not
intend to rehash the many legal issues here; instead I focus narrowly
on the case's unmanageable equal protection standard.
Republican candidate George W. Bush challenged on equal
protection grounds the standards for a statewide recount of the votes
that the Florida Supreme Court had articulated in Democratic
candidate Al Gore's election contest. The Bush v. Gore per curiam
opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court began its equal protection
analysis with the following words:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial
allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well
to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right
to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary
and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that
of another. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
118. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
119. The line of cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 630 (1993),
establishing the "unconstitutional racial gerrymander," also fits into this category.
Chapter 7 of LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 42, explores the development of this
constitutional claim. I note here only that the "bizarreness" standard of Shaw and the
"predominant factor" standard of the post-Shaw case of Miller v. Johnson might be
understood as a battle between Justices O'Connor and Kennedy over how unmanageable
a standard should be applied to this new constitutional claim.
120. For an overview of the legal issues surrounding the case, see LOWENsTEIN &
HASEN, supra note 42, chs. 3, 4.
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U.S. 663, 665 (1966). It must be remembered that "the right
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).121
After noting that "[t]he question before us... is whether the
recount procedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are
consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate
treatment of the members of its electorate,"'" the Court answered the
question in the negative. It held that the recount mechanism adopted
by the Florida Supreme Court did "not satisfy the minimum
requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure
the fundamental right"" under the Equal Protection Clause for four
related reasons: (1) although the Florida court had instructed that
those individuals conducting the manual recounts judge ballots by
discerning the "intent of the voter," it failed to formulate uniform
rules to determine such intent, such as whether to count as a valid
vote a ballot whose chad is hanging by two comers; (2) the recounts
already undertaken included a manual recount of all votes in selected
counties, including both undervotes and overvotes, but the new
recounts ordered by the Florida court included only undervotes; (3)
the Florida Supreme Court had ordered that the current vote totals
include results of a partial recount from Miami-Dade County,
allowing the Supreme Court to conclude that "[t]he Florida Supreme
Court's decision thus gives no assurance that the recounts included in
a final certification must be complete;" and (4) the Florida Supreme
Court did not specify who would count the ballots, forcing county
boards to include team members without experience in recounting
ballots. Nor were observers permitted to object during the recount. 24
After holding the Florida procedure violated the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court refused to remand the case to the Florida courts to
articulate standards that would comply with the clause.1 5
So what precisely is the equal protection holding of Bush v.
Gore? Commentators have noted that the case's judicial standard is
muddled. Professors Doff and Issacharoff, for example, write that
121. 531 U.S. 98,104-05 (2000).
122. Id. at 105.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 109.
125. Id. at 110. This was among the most controversial portions of the opinion. For a
criticism of the Court's decision on this point, see Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the
Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377,388-90 (2001).
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"[w]here Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims spawned a judicially-
enforceable rule that is, if anything, unduly mechanical, the per
curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore was perfectly opaque as to what
impact, if any, its decision would have on future challenges to election
procedure."126 Similarly, Professor Overton noted that the Court
avoided the "articulation of a clear, workable rule."'12 7
By including language in the opinion limiting its precedential
value to the "present circumstances,"'2 perhaps the case means
nothing for the future development of equal protection law. On the
other hand, by including vastly broad language indicating that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause to "value one person's vote over
that of another,"'129 the opinion has potentially broad implications.
Indeed, in another article I explore how the equal protection holding
in Bush v. Gore might-and I emphasize might-apply to a host of
other "nuts and bolts" election questions. 30
The opacity of the equal protection holding is actually the best
feature of a very bad opinion. Overton noted, "the Court ... left
lower courts and others without manageable tools to determine equal
protection violations in the political context""'31-precisely, and all for
the good. Now, as myriad cases make their way through the federal
courts raising a Bush v. Gore equal protection claim (for example, is
punch-card voting, with its relatively high error rate, now
unconstitutional?), the courts will try different approaches to deal
with the claims. Bush v. Gore will be viewed by lower court lenses in
Rashomonic fashion and the Court will eventually sort it out. If the
Court does its job well, it can refine its new equal protection standard
in light of what works and does not work in the lower courts. 32
The Court was right to articulate an unmanageable standard
because its holding was unprecedented and not in line with any social
consensus about the proper standards to use in the recounting of
ballots, an issue about which the public had no opinion before the
126. Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 923,932 (2001).
127. Overton, supra note 8, at 93.
128. 531 U.S. at 109.
129. Id. at 104-05.
130. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 378 (considering the application of the case to
challenges to punch card voting, recount standards, and the use of the "butterfly ballot").
131. Overton, supra note 8, at 93.
132. I am not predicting that the Court will do so. In fact I have predicted that the
Court will eventually assign no precedential value to the case. Hasen, supra note 125, at
381. But the Court should do so, assuming it really believes there was an equal protection
violation in the case. Id. at 379.
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2000 controversy. As noted above, the Bush v. Gore Court's principal
authority for its holding was Reynolds and Harper.133 Neither case
involved the mechanics of elections, what had heretofore been seen
to be a matter for local officials. Indeed, the Court in recent years
had expressed great deference to local officials who wished to
structure their elections in the way they see fit."
The Court in Bush v. Gore moved in a new direction, without
societal consensus or precedential reason to do so. Opacity made
sense.
III. UNMANAGEABLE STANDARD OR No STANDARD: THE COURT
AND FEAR OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
Lurking in the background of many of these election cases
decided under the Equal Protection Clause is what Professor Sanford
Levinson has called the "brooding omnipresence of proportional
representation."3 5 Levinson explained that courts and commentators
would not be concerned with thorny issues such as the
constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering if the Warren Court in
Baker "had not embarked on what was widely (and perhaps
correctly) perceived as a radical intervention into long-established
modes of apportioning legislative seats.""' 6 Once the Court opened
the door to claims of inequality in a system that granted everyone a
vote, it opened the door as well to claims that the Constitution
demanded greater proportionality in the voting systems used. This
fear of proportional representation goes all the way back to Reynolds,
where Justice Stewart in dissent in the companion Lucas case warned
that the majority's position would lead to proportional
representation. 37
The fear that political equality arguments, pushed to the
extreme, might lead to court-imposed proportional representation is
not laughable."8 Assuming the Justices have this fear,"9 the question
becomes what strategy the Court should use to block this
development. The Court appears to have used two strategies:
133. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
134. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 388 (describing such cases).
135. Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of
Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257,257 (1985).
136. Id. at 259.
137. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,750 n.12 (1964).
138. See Levinson, supra note 135, at 259.
139. I do not claim that the Justices should fear proportional representation, although
Levinson offers a number of reasons why they might. See id. at 271-76.
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refusing to extend its political equality precedents to new types of
claims and using unmanageable standards as a bulwark against
extreme cases of political inequality.
Mobile v. Bolden141 is an example of the Court using the first
strategy. In Mobile, African-American residents of Mobile, Alabama
brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the
city's at-large method of electing its three city commissioners under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
under the Fifteenth Amendment. The evidence showed that African-
American voters made up about one-third of the Mobile electorate,
but given the persistence of substantial voting along racial lines and
the use of at-large voting rather than single-member districts, no
African-American-preferred candidate had ever been elected
commissioner or was likely to be elected commissioner in the
foreseeable future.' Had voting taken place using single-member,
rather than at-large districts, African-American voters would have
had a better chance to elect a candidate of their choice, or at least to
exert greater political influence. 42
The Court rejected the argument that the at-large method
violated the Equal Protection Clause.'4 1 A four-Justice plurality
stated that plaintiffs' claim failed because the plaintiffs lacked
evidence that the electoral system was designed with a racially
discriminatory purpose.144 Justice Blackmun concurred in the result
on grounds that the relief afforded by the trial court "was not
commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial discretion.' 1 45
Justice Stevens concurred essentially on grounds that a contrary
ruling would be impossible to administer. 46
Three Justices dissented. 147 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, relied explicitly on Reynolds v. Sims" in arguing that the
at-large system constituted a denial of equal protection:
140. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
141. Id. at 122-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 105 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 65-80 (plurality opinion). The Court also rejected the Fifteenth
Amendment claim, but I focus here only on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.
144. Id. at 65-70 (plurality opinion).
145. Id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 93 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("A contrary view 'would spawn endless
litigation concerning the multi-member district systems now widely employed in this
country,' and would entangle the judiciary in a voracious political thicket.") (citation
omitted).
147. Justice White dissented on grounds that the plaintiffs had proved purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 103 (White, J., dissenting).
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Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny focused solely on the
discriminatory effects of malapportionment. They recognize
that, when population figures for the representational
districts of a legislature are not similar, the votes of citizens
in larger districts do not carry as much weight in the
legislature as do votes cast by citizens in smaller districts.
The equal protection problem attacked by the "one person,
one vote" principle is, then, one of vote dilution: under
Reynolds, each citizen must have an "equally effective
voice" in the election of representatives. In the present
cases, the alleged vote dilution, though caused by the
combined effects of the electoral structure and social and
historical factors rather than by unequal population
distribution, is analytically the same concept: the unjustified
abridgment of a fundamental right. It follows, then, that a
showing of discriminatory intent is just as unnecessary under
the vote-dilution approach.., as it is under our
reapportionment cases.149
The plurality rejected Justice Marshall's reliance on Reynolds. It
saw his dissent as an endorsement of proportional representation and
"not the law. The Equal Protection Clause... does not require
proportional representation as an imperative of political
organization.' 150
Regardless of whether Justice Marshall's position should
properly be characterized as an endorsement of proportional
representation, it seems no more a stretch to extend the equal
protection analysis of Reynolds to the means of aggregating votes,
what Marshall refers to as "electoral structures," than to the
mechanics of voting. In other words, the principle of promoting
political equality has no "natural" stopping point, even if we can draw
distinctions among the cases.
Thus, a plurality of Justices wished to stop the equality
precedents from going so far as proportional representation, while
two other Justices saw Justice Marshall's test as an unmanageable
148. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 116-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
149. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 116-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
150. Id. at 75-76 (plurality opinion). For a critical examination of the concept of vote
dilution, see Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why I Don't
Understand the Concept of Vote Dilution), 50 VAND. L. REv. 327 passim (1997).
151. See Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1356-1425 (1983)
(providing history of enactment of revised section 2 in response to Mobile v. Bolden).
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one. In retrospect, the plurality's fears appear unfounded. Congress
essentially codified Justice Marshall's position in Mobile v. Bolden
through an amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
1982.152 Although section 2 has moved "electoral structures" toward
greater proportionality, it does not appear to have created any
general right to proportional representation. The Court has been
careful not to interpret section 2 so broadly.53
If indeed it was primarily fear of proportional representation,
rather than some concern on the merits, that led the Mobile v. Bolden
plurality away from a holding in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court
should have considered instead imposing an unmanageable standard
to see if lower courts could develop satisfactory ways to adjudicate
these claims. The Court appears to have (perhaps unwittingly)
adopted this type of approach in another election case from the 1980s,
Davis v. Bandemer.'1 Bandemer involved the question of whether a
political party could raise a claim of unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering. A majority of the Court concluded that the Indiana
Democrats' claim that the 1981 redistricting plan violated their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause was justiciable.' 55 Then, speaking
for a plurality of the Court, Justice White articulated an
unmanageable standard for judging when an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander has occurred.
The plurality's analysis began by stating that to make such a
claim, proving both "intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group" is
necessary. The plurality summarily upheld the district court's finding
of discriminatory intent, noting that one party controlling the
districting process often will have the intent of discriminating against
the other party.5 6
The big question in Bandemer was how a political party could
prove "actual discriminatory effect." The plurality's analysis on this
point began by recognizing that there is no constitutional right to
proportional representation 157 and that "mere lack of proportional
representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
153. See generally LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 42, ch. 6 (discussing the
relationship of section 2 to proportional representation).
154. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
155. Id. at 125.
156. Id. at 127-28 (plurality opinion).
157. Id. at 130 (plurality opinion).
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discrimination."'158 "Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs
only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the
political process as a whole."'159 Applying this test, the Court
concluded that the Indiana Democrats failed to prove discriminatory
effect.
Commentators have disagreed on the meaning of Bandemer
since it was decided. Professor Bernard Groflnan, for example,
construed the case to mean that partisan gerrymandering is unlawful
when it is "(1) intentional, (2) severe, and (3) predictably
nontransient in its effects."'" Professor Dan Lowenstein, in contrast,
believes that the Court imposed an extremely high bar for proving
partisan gerrymandering, but did so in a way to "retain the option to
intervene." He suggests that perhaps members of the plurality did so
because they "recogniz[ed] the complexity of the subject, [and they]
may have been uncertain what abusive practices might be brought to
light in the future .... "I
Professor Tribe contends that the plurality opinion did not give
"any real guidance to lower courts forced to adjudicate this issue." 162
In other words, Bandemer is a case of unmanageable standards. Since
Bandemer, lower courts have struggled with Bandemer and
allegations of partisan gerrymandering thus far have met with little
success. 63 Indeed, Professor McConnell has called the Bandemer
standard "so toothless that [the Court] might as well have held
partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable."' 6
These historical developments belie the strongly voiced concerns
at the time of Bandemer that the case likely would lead to a
constitutional right to proportional representation. Justice
O'Connor, in her Bandemer concurrence, stated that the plurality's
"standard will over time either prove unmanageable and arbitrary or
else evolve toward some loose form of proportionality."'65 Professor
158. Id. at 132 (plurality opinion).
159. Id. (plurality opinion).
160. Bernard Grofman, Toward a Coherent Theory of Gerrymandering: Bandemer
and Thornburg, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 29,30-32 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1990).
161. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal
Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 160, at 64,
96-97.
162. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1083 (2d ed. 1988).
163. See LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 42, at 197 n.8.
164. McConnell, supra note 29, at 114.
165. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,155 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Peter Schuck developed these arguments further, purporting to
demonstrate that "Bandemer, despite the Court's disclaimer, Will
encourage proportionality as the standard against which partisan
gerrymandering claims will tend to be measured."' 66
For good or not, Bandemer's unmanageability has served as a
bulwark against proportional representation. Had lower courts more
aggressively interpreted Bandemer to create such a right, the
Supreme Court was ready to reinterpret its standard in Bandemer to
reverse the trend. In the meantime, as Lowenstein suggests,
Bandemer serves as a backstop (and perhaps as a deterrent) to police
the most egregious forms of partisan gerrymandering. The
unmanageability solution, rather than the path taken in Mobile v.
Bolden, provides the Court with the greatest flexibility as it ponders
these political questions about which it sometimes has little more to
go on than intuition.
CONCLUSION
Unmanageability in the pursuit of political equality is no vice.
Indeed, unmanageable judicial standards have much to commend
them in certain circumstances. If we think about the overused
metaphor of the Court making its way through the political thicket,
we might imagine a few ways that the Court could reach its
destination. We begin with the Court stuck in a deep forest.
Manageable standards are the equivalent of the leader using all of her
resources to clear the path in a particular direction. That strategy is
appropriate if one has a very good sense of where one wants to go,
but dangerous if one does not.
When unsure of the correct direction, the leader's best strategy
might be to stay in a single location and send a few scouts out along
different paths. Each scout then reports to the leader with updated
information on the paths available. The leader, after receiving this
information, can then make a more informed decision on the ultimate
path to be taken. If the Court, as is likely, will remain in the political
thicket, unmanageability may be one of the best tools available for
finding the right paths.
166. Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1325,1361 (1987).
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